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 Context: The Military and the “Deep State”  
Unlike Tunisia’s more orderly and quicker transition, over a year after the 
removal of ex-President Hosni Mubarak, the situation in Egypt remains 
confused. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military junta 
which took over from the former President, has undertaken certain steps 
towards transition, but opinion on their intentions remains deeply divided. 
Increasingly, it is clear that they constitute the hard core of Mubarak’s regime, 
that they are fighting for their survival, and that in this struggle, they are more 
than prepared to sacrifice the demands for freedom and social justice which 
were at the core of the uprising which began on January 25th, 2011. 
Appreciating the complexities of the wider political situation in Egypt is crucial 
to understand the magnitude of the obstacles which independent civil society 
groups face in Egypt today. 
The basic demand of the uprising, in Egypt as in Tunisia, is encapsulated by one 
of its best-known slogans: ash-sha’b yurid isqaat an-nizaam, the people want 
the downfall of the regime. It was not simply a question of removing Mubarak, 
but of ending the entire clientelistic, authoritarian system which made life 
intolerable for ordinary Egyptians: decades of systematic abuse of power by the 
police and security services, corruption from the highest political levels to the 
most lowly bureaucrats, rising living costs and low wages, and unemployment 
are only a few of the more high-profile difficulties. This system worked to the 
advantage of corrupt business leaders led by the President’s son Gamal, of the 
mafia-like intelligence and police services, of the President’s National 
Democratic Party, which channelled patronage, and of the armed forces, the 
reputation of which emerged relatively unscathed from Mubarak’s corrupt 
regime not least because they were relatively sidelined within it, but who 
nonetheless hold vast economic and political power.  
It is only in the context of this oppressive nizaam, or regime, that it is possible 
to understand the unprecedented turnout of protests on January 25th, and their 
determination not to back down in the face of intense repression throughout the 
protests. On February 11th, 2011, crowds across Egypt rejoiced at the President’s 
downfall – to be sure, a momentous, unprecedented event in Egyptian history – 
but a year since Mubarak’s removal by the military, the core of that nizaam 
remains in place, and the empire has been striking back. The military effectively 
removed Mubarak and purged core elements of the former regime – the 
businessmen linked to Mubarak’s son Gamal, such as steel magnate Ahmad Ezz. 
Since then, SCAF has been attempting to consolidate their grip on power. The 
way they have done this relies on a combination of several tactics: first, stoking 
populist – and often highly xenophobic – rhetoric through state-controlled 
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media in order to bolster their legitimacy and stigmatise pro-democracy 
opposition; second, postponing the handover of power and making occasional 
concessions when they received strong pushback from civil society; third, by 
attempting (often with considerable success) to divide the opposition, especially 
by tempting the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) with the prospect of power-sharing.1 
 
 Movements and the Challenge of the Revolution 
In a way, the project of the Uprising should not have led one to expect anything 
less than this kind of entrenched counter-revolutionary effort. The Uprising, 
after all, set itself ambitious targets. These are best summed up by its two best-
known slogans. The first, ash-sha’b yurid isqaat al-nizaam (the people want the 
downfall of the regime) signalled the deep rejection of the parasitic corruption 
and abuse of power which permeated every aspect of ordinary life. The second, 
aish, horreya, adala igtema'eya (bread, freedom, social justice) maps out the 
kind of society protesters wished to see the old/new regime replaced by: a more 
inclusive social, economic and political system to replace the oligarchic, 
authoritarian kleptocracy which has ruled Egypt to date.  
These two slogans by and large capture the goals and values of the broad range 
of groups which took part in the January uprising from its inception, and which 
constitute the historical core of the pro-democracy movement in Egypt.  
This rubric includes several different kinds of groups, with different priorities 
and methods of action. Broadly, they can be divided between the historical core 
of the movement which comprises “extra-parliamentary” activist or 
independent NGOs, independent trade unions, and the parliamentary groups – 
largely discredited, before the uprising – including leftist parties such as 
Tagammu liberal groups such as Ayman Nour’s Al-Ghad (Tomorrow), or 
smaller Islamist groups like the Wasat (Centre) party.  
The first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections, held between November 2011 
and February 2012, saw the virtual disappearance of Mubarak’s vehicle for 
clientelism, the National Democratic Party, and brought different groups to 
parliament, from the Social-Democratic Party to the liberal Egypt Bloc to the 
Revolution Continues group, the effectiveness of which remains to be seen: their 
test will be not so much in terms of impact on legislation, since the parliament is 
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party (which 
received about 47% of seats) and the hardline Salafist Al-Nour (Light) Party, 
which received 29%, but rather in faithfulness to the objectives of the uprising 
                                                                            
1 For a review of the general Egyptian context and the role of the military and the Brotherhood, 
see Andrea Teti (2012), “Egypt's Uprising One Year On,” ECIA Briefing, 10/2; 
http://www.european-centre.org/ecia-briefings/egypt-one-year-on/; Andrea Teti, “Egypt’s 
Uprising: Still Talking About A Revolution,” Berfrois, February 17th, 2012, 
http://www.berfrois.com/2012/02/andrea-teti-egypt-one-year-on/; on SCAF-Brotherhood 
relations, see Robert Springborg, “Egypt’s Cobra and Mongoose,” Egypt Independent, February 
27th, 2012; http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/683311 last accessed March 2nd, 2012. 
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and resisting cooptation by the regime, which proved the downfall of the old 
Leftist and Liberal parties.  
Among the NGOs, the most prominent are organisations such as the Egyptian 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) headed by Khaled Ali, also now 
officially running in the 2012 presidential elections, the New Woman 
Foundation (NWF), the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre (HMLC) and the Centre 
for Trade Union Workers’ Services (CTUWS). Among the independent trade 
unions, Real Estate Tax Collectors’ (RETA) union was the first (established in 
December 2008) but has been followed by literally hundreds of new unions 
since the January uprising. Kamal Abu Eita, who heads RETA, is also chairman 
of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), formed on 
January 31st, 2011.  
The independent trade unions and “activist NGOs” are certainly the most 
important component of the movement, both in terms of independence from 
the regime, and in terms of the efficacy of their action. Over the past decade, 
they have used a range of methods in their struggle against the regime and for 
the mobilisation of the population.2 Groups like HMLC or CTUWS, for example, 
are trying to provide legal services to workers in order to help them fight for 
their rights. Some NGOs focus on monitoring and advocacy in human rights. 
Independent trade unions attempt to organise formally, although labour 
legislation still has not been changed to allow for freedom of association, 
retaining the top-down, regime-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation as 
the sole legal representative for workers. In these activities, groups use a variety 
of instruments, from strikes to single-issue campaigns, new communications 
technologies to print media and word of mouth.  
 
 Objectives  
Broadly, the objectives these groups give themselves – the matalib al-thawra, 
goals of the revolution – are several, but primarily fall under the rubrics of 
social justice and political inclusion. 
With respect to economic policy, the object of protest is an economic system 
which disenfranchises vast swathes of society. Beyond the frequently cited 
figure of 40% of the population living beneath the $2/day poverty line, which 
                                                                            
2 For a review of the specific tactics used during the January uprising, see “Egyptian Activists’ 
Plan: Translated,” The Atlantic Monthly, January 27th, 2011; last accessed March 3rd, 2012; 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/egyptian-activists-action-plan-
translated/70388/. For a view of the mobilisation on the day from the South-West of Cairo, see 
Lorenzo Trombetta, “Anti-regime protesters and loyalist forces in Cairo. A dialectical 
confrontation,” last accessed March 3rd, 2012; http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2011/12/city-
state-resistance-spaces-of-protest-in-the-middle-east-and-mediterranean/; as well as Al-
Jazeera English’s documentary on the April 6th movement: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QrNz0dZgqN8;  
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actually underestimates poverty levels3, the “liberalising” reforms of the past 
decade and a half, and especially since Ahmad Nazif’s government from 2004 to 
the 2011 uprising, have had a dire impact on ordinary people’s lives. Before the 
uprising, local riots broke out after nation-wide shortages in subsidised bread 
(aish). There has also been a recent gas crisis despite the government exporting 
considerable quantities of gas. And while Cairo’s elites are relocating to gated 
communities, dragging state investment in infrastructure with them, slums and 
informal settlements (ashwa’iyyat) are the norm for millions of the city’s poor, 
and remain largely without – or with very expensive – basic services. The City of 
the Dead, a cemetery just outside of historical Cairo, is estimated to house 2 
million of the capital’s living.  
Recently, the effects of those policies have certainly been made worse by the 
recent world-wide spike in food prices, but the long-term trends have long been 
in place. In one of its few populist measures, the military junta took the step of 
increasing public sector salaries by 7% and inviting the private sector to match 
it, although this one-off hike is quickly nullified by the combination of pre-
existing income gaps and inflation. This context makes clear why the continuous 
calls from business and from the IMF and other international financial 
organisations (IFIs) to cut subsidies on basic foodstuffs like bread, cooking oil, 
and petrol are highly controversial among the poor and – increasingly – the 
middle classes, and helps explain the presence of the country’s poor in the 
January-February 2011 uprising. Unsurprisingly, many groups involved in the 
uprisings are staunchly opposed to continuing Mubarak’s privatization 
programme – for example, the privatization of water, electricity, petrol, and 
natural gas – and many wish to see it at least partially reversed. 
Another familiar policy amongst oppositions groups is the institution of a 
national minimum and maximum wage. In the private sector alone, pay can 
range from LE240 ($4) to LE50,000-500,000 ($8,300-83,000) for the higher 
echelons of public administration (e.g. ministers, deputies, etc.) in take-home 
pay and benefits alone, i.e. without counting the income from corruption. Other 
measures called for by pro-democracy groups include land redistribution 
(Mubarak and Nazif reversed the few safeguards Nasser had put in place against 
latifundia and smallholder/labourer exploitation), safeguards in “special 
economic zones” (SEZs) where workers are even less protected, and the 
renegotiation of “odious debt” incurred under the Mubarak regime.4  
One of the more interesting campaigns conducted by opposition groups has 
been the boycott of products and services provided by military-owned 
companies: the military’s vast economic empire – the so-called “pasta 
                                                                            
3 For critical reviews of this literature and its implications for Cairo, see Bush 2004 and Sabry 
2010. 
4 “Drop ‘dictator debt,’ activists and economists say,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, October 28th, 2011; 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/509601; last accessed March 1st, 2012. The issue of 
SEZs is not viewed as entirely separate from the WB/IMF debate, but not debated as 
extensively, not least because business elites – secular or Islamist – are heavily involved in 
SEZs. 
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economy”, of which there is increasing general awareness – relies on a 
combination of exploitation of conscripts, often forced to make and then buy 
products, and state subsidies, which put the military in a position to loan the 
government $1bn last December.5 
On a political level, there are several demands common to the full range of the 
opposition. In relation to elections and the “mainstream” political arena, 
different groups have emphasized different demands, for example in relation to 
the timing and sequencing of parliamentary and presidential elections and of 
writing the new constitution. All, however, have been concerned with the 
enormous advantage in terms of organisation and funding which established 
groups – the Muslim Brotherhood and lower-profile but well-funded Salafi 
movements – would inevitably have in elections. A few chose for this reason not 
to concentrate on elections at all, but rather on building nation-wide grassroots 
organisations, not unlike the Brotherhood itself. 
In other respects, the voices coming from independent pro-democracy groups 
have been fairly consistent. Some of these demands focus on requests for firm 
guarantees for freedom of speech and association, which Western governmental 
donors have for the most part focused on (albeit imperfectly). Importantly, 
freedom of association is demanded not just for NGOs and other civil society 
actors, but also for trade unions. This requires liberalising both the NGO law 
and the unions law, both of which currently provide a raft of instruments for the 
regime’s control of independent associations. 
A second raft of demands also requires legislative change. First among these is 
the reform of the security services in general, and specifically of the Ministry of 
Interior. Here, pro-democracy groups are pushing for accountability of the 
security services, particularly with respect to the widespread abuse of power 
both before and after the uprising, and for effective civilian oversight of these 
bodies. First and foremost, all groups demand the lifting of the emergency law. 
Finally, it is important to note that while economic demands have often been 
represented in Western and local media as separate and higher priorities than 
political demands by demonstrators, from speaking to activists and from 
documents produced by groups across the left-liberal political spectrum, it is 
clear that these two dimensions are inseparable. 
 
 Obstacles 
The obstacles pro-democracy opposition groups face are many, from the 
systematic harassment of members and supporters by the police and security 
services, to the bureaucratic obstacles placed in their way. Legislation itself 
                                                                            
5 “Army loans $1 billion to central bank,” The Daily News Egypt, December 2nd, 2011; 
http://thedailynewsegypt.com/economy/army-loans-1-billion-to-central-bank.html; last 
accessed March 1st, 2012. Other campaigns include the Kazeboon (Liars), No Military Trials for 
Civilians, and Emsek Felool (Catch the Remnants) against former ruling party members running 
in post-Mubarak elections. 
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poses major difficulties. For example, NGOs have to be registered with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, and while the registration regime is in theory 
permissive – NGOs have to apply for recognition, and are (illegally) vetted by 
the security services, but if a ruling is not issued by MoSA within 60 days, 
approval is implicit – in practice neither the letter nor the spirit of the law are 
respected by authorities. For unions, there is the obligation of being part of the 
official Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), a top-down organisation in 
which strike actions, for example, have to be approved by the regime-appointed 
leadership. This kind of legislative architecture is often so restrictive that some 
groups – the Center for Trade Union Workers’ Services (CTUWS) is a prime 
example – find it easier to establish themselves as law firms rather than NGOs 
or unions. 
The issue that has certainly received most coverage recently has been the so-
called “foreign funding” debate and the aggressive moves made by the regime 
against a wide range of NGOs. The background to this “debate” is the 
increasingly strident nationalism the regime has stoked, not least thanks to 
state-controlled media, which despite the growing role of “new media” is still 
pivotal in Egypt. The function of this choice seems to be to simultaneously 
provide the regime with some kind of “revolutionary” fig leaf and to stigmatise 
and politically marginalise the “revolutionary youth”.  
The accusation levelled at opposition NGOs by Minister for Social Solidarity 
Faiza Aboulnaga has been that NGOs have received unauthorised foreign 
funding and/or operated without a licence. The accusation is disingenuous: 
firstly, because Aboulnaga was herself responsible for NGO oversight under 
Mubarak; secondly, because while the legislation is permissive with regard to 
NGO registration, the state ignored this and kept promising particularly 
Western NGOs that authorisation would be forthcoming; thirdly, because the 
crackdown focused virtually exclusively on pro-democracy NGOs while ignoring 
the very sizeable funding accruing to, say, the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi 
groups from the Gulf; and finally, of course, because the largest recipient of 
“foreign funding” is the Egyptian state itself, which receives funds from the US 
government alone to the tune of nearly $3bn per year, with $1.5bn going to the 
military. 
This, however, is not to say that the “foreign funding” debate does not touch 
upon genuine issues. The debate itself, as opposed to the xenophobic populism 
touted by state-controlled media, has actually been going on in Egyptian civil 
society for a long time before the 2011 Egyptian uprising, and in much more 
sophisticated terms.6 In essence, it revolves around the question of whether it is 
at all justifiable to draw on funds from foreign states, particularly Western 
governments or organisations close to them.  
                                                                            
6 For an excellent introduction to the pre-uprising debate within Egyptian civil society, see Pratt 
2006. The authors’ own fieldwork, conducted between December 2008 and November 2010 in 
Cairo, and in London, Amsterdam, and Brussels on European donors, confirms and updates 
some of Pratt’s findings. 
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Some groups have indeed received funding from Western governmental and 
quasi-governmental organisations, including groups such as Al-Gil and the 
Suzanne Mubarak Foundation – in fact, Egyptian Government-Organized Non-
Governmental Organisations (GONGOs) have been particularly adept at 
absorbing US and EU funding. Amongst independent NGOs, many distinguish 
between governmental and non-governmental funding, and while rejecting the 
former, are prepared to apply for the latter. Indeed, often the debate 
distinguishes between specific organisations, based on their (perceived) 
proximity to governments of certain countries – primarily the US, the UK and 
France. Several prominent Egyptian human rights organisations fall into this 
category, distinguishing between different donors. On the other hand, some 
argue that receiving funding from Western organisations makes local rights 
groups dependent on Western agendas, and in any case dependent on foreign 
sources of funding for their activities, which means a certain vulnerability to 
funding being cut off or leveraged at any point.  
Although the vulnerability – whether politically motivated or not – is a genuine 
difficulty, the “dependency argument” risks underplaying the degree to which 
local organisations – and indeed, international NGOs that fund them –
 consciously adapt to the procedural demands made by their patrons, while 
remaining true to their original remits. It also has to be emphasised that in 
several cases the debate over whether to even apply for such funding has been 
hammered out in internal discussions, often with the result that an organisation 
would apply, but consciously not adapting their goals or language to suit donors’ 
(perceived) preferences.7 Ultimately, the difficulty NGOs face particularly when 
dealing with politically thorny issues such as workers’ rights or human rights 
generally, is that while the regime obviously has no incentive to provide (or 
allow) funding unless they can reasonably expect to co-opt rights leaders 
through patronage, the targets of these NGOs’ activities are often the poorest 
and most defenceless in society, and it is hardly realistic to expect such 
organisations to support themselves on funding from such constituencies. 
The “debate”, particularly when manipulated by the military junta and its 
civilian backers, is of course disingenuous in another crucial but unspoken 
assumption, namely that the Egyptian regime would provide these 
organisations with funds to conduct the kind of work to understand, deal with, 
and mobilise against the political and economic marginalisation which is the 
principal effect – if not instrument – of the elites which control that regime 
itself. 
One of the problems in the current context overall is that serious, in-depth 
discussion concerning key issues, from the role of IFIs to “foreign funding”, 
from the military’s economic influence to addressing poverty, is hijacked by the 
kind of often xenophobic populist nationalism stoked by the military and drawn 
                                                                            
7 Activists in different Egyptian NGOs expressed this opinion in interviews with the authors 
conducted in January 2009 and November 2010. 
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upon by the Brotherhood and Salafi groups to deflect attention from these 
issues and their inability to provide long-term solutions to them. 
 
 Divisions within the Movement 
Aside from the differences over the issue of external funding, there are several 
divisions within the “pro-democracy” camp broadly writ.  
Firstly, there is a debate about whether parliamentary or extra-parliamentary 
forms of action are preferable. The parliamentary route has certain advantages 
in the eyes of some, for example the ability to bring issues of social justice to the 
agenda of parliamentary debate and wider public opinion. For others, 
parliament both before and after the January uprising is tainted by the levers of 
co-option the regime has used in the past, neutering parties like the Wafd, Ghad 
and Tagammu’ at least partially, and the objective ought rather to be building a 
mass base which would give movements and trade unions strength whether or 
not they are present in parliament.  
Secondly, there is the question of relations with the SCAF military junta and 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. While the reputation of the junta in the eyes of 
most activists – particularly liberals and leftists – is now irretrievably tainted, 
and very few see compromise with the military as a viable option, the debate on 
Islamists is ongoing. This debate is one of the elements of continuity with the 
pre-uprising context. Feminist organisations such as the New Woman 
Foundation, for example, faced the problem of working with pro-regime 
GONGOs like the Suzanne Mubarak Foundation and Islamist groups like the 
Muslim Sisterhood (the women’s section of the Brotherhood). The debate 
within these organisations revolved around the possibility that collaborations on 
specific issues could yield short-term gains, against the likelihood that these 
gains would be reversed or paid for with larger losses in other areas. 
Thirdly, specifically with regard to the independent labour movement, there is 
the problem of achieving a degree of coordination for unitary action. EFITU, the 
new independent federation, has grown very rapidly since its establishment on 
January 31st, 2011, and now comprises over two hundred unions of varying size. 
Achieving a degree of “internal democracy” for EFITU will be crucial in 
retaining the level of legitimacy and mobilisation which workers have achieved 
in the run-up to the January Uprising and since then. There have also been the 
first signs of fissures within EFITU: its two principal founding organisations, 
Kamal Abu Eita’s RETA and Kamal Abbas’ CTUWS fell out last autumn, and 
CTUWS has withdrawn from EFITU. The differences were on the surface related 
to “foreign funding”, but also to basic strategic objectives for the labour 
movement, with RETA favouring focusing unionisation drives on the still large 
public sector, while CTUWS aims to extend unionisation into the private sector 
and into Special Economic Zones, where workers have even fewer rights. 
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 The Muslim Brotherhood:  
Decorative Opposition by another Name? 
The MB has come to be seen by many activists – not least several amongst its 
own youth movement – as primarily interested in riding the wave of the 
January uprising in order to achieve a compromise with SCAF, rather than 
displaying any allegiance to the Uprising’s principles. The Brotherhood has 
therefore backed the military on issues such as elections, and has condemned 
pro-democracy demonstrators nearly as eagerly as the junta. Having dominated 
the lower house elections gaining nearly half of its seats, and far and away 
outperformed any other party gaining 68% of seats in the (largely powerless) 
upper house, the Brotherhood’s “red lines” seem to be linked to parliament’s 
powers and presidential elections. More importantly, the Brotherhood’s 
leadership has consistently appeared ready to compromise with the junta – and 
even with the then-embattled Mubarak – in return for some kind of informal 
power-sharing arrangement with SCAF.  
But the Brotherhood’s tactics are potentially risky. Over the past ten months, its 
leadership has often underestimated popular desire for change. At crucial points 
such as the run-up to the January Uprising and the November protests, it 
publicly criticised protests, and by encouraging its supporters to stay at home, 
was badly wrong-footed by the massive popular support such protests had. The 
MB leadership spectacularly misjudged the reception calls to demonstrate on 
January 25th would have, and while it later declared itself part of revolutionary 
forces, it explicitly refused to join the November millioneyya (million-person) 
marches, preferring instead to echo the junta’s own old, authoritarian rhetoric 
of “foreign hands” and plots to destabilize Egypt. Such was the disaffection 
between protesters and the MB that on some occasions when high-ranking 
Brotherhood representatives tried to go to Tahrir to show their participation in 
anti-SCAF protests and “bathe” in revolutionary legitimacy, were booed off the 
square, and some have pointed to disaffection amongst its youth possibly 
turning into a haemorrhage towards other parties.  
With regard to the Brotherhood’s youth, the picture is fairly confused: many 
were an integral part of the uprising from the very beginning – against the 
express indications of their leadership – but while some have left the MB and 
some have been expelled, many have chosen to remain within it. This has 
sapped the potential drift of support away from the MB and its FJP party, and 
towards other parties such as the Wasat or the splinter party El-Tayyar, which 
fared badly in recent elections. It also does not augur well for the chances of 
former MB “youth leader” Abd el-Moneim Aboul Futouh in upcoming 
presidential elections.  
Within the MB, leaders like Aboul Futouh and Essam El-Erian, who are the 
more “politicised” among the leadership and also the more pragmatic – if not 
liberal – in their number, had already been marginalised within the governing 
structures of the Brotherhood well before the January Uprising. Octogenarian 
leaders like Muhammad Badie preferred the Brotherhood’s historically 
moderate, pragmatic and apolitical stance, attempting to cut deals with the 
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regime rather than use the Brotherhood’s mass support to put pressure on it for 
radical change. 
Some view this choice of tactics as a calculated one, believing that disaffected 
members will soon return. Either way, this approach is entirely in line with the 
MB’s tried and tested tactics of attempting on the one hand to pragmatically 
compromise with power, and on the other hand continue to increase its 
influence in a range of “non-political” organisations such as lawyers, teacher 
and pharmacist syndicates, in several of which it has recently won internal 
elections.8 
There is, ultimately, a possibly even more basic problem that divides the 
Brotherhood – certainly its leadership – from other opposition groups. This is 
not so much the much-debated issue of the “role of Islam” in Egyptian public 
life, which receives many headlines, particularly outside Egypt, but rather its 
economic policies. Some have already been pointing out the degree to which the 
current leadership is “business-friendly”– there is nothing in the group’s 
ideology which opposes private property or the profit motive per se – and its 
policies are essentially continuous with the liberalisations of Mubarak’s 
government, not least because key Brotherhood leaders are themselves 
businessmen.  
There is in this sense a tension between the Brotherhood’s acceptance of those 
privatization policies which so badly hurt the weaker sections of society, and the 
charitable activities intended to support them. Nor has corruption been far 
removed from the Brotherhood’s businessmen, as the controversy surrounding 
the trial of tycoon Khayrat El-Shater shows.9 In the short run, the Brotherhood 
can deflect attention form this tension by focusing on corruption, but in the long 
run, particularly if the Brotherhood is allowed to govern, this tension will 
become more evident – for example in relation to the group’s approval of SEZs 
– and the fissures within the movement may deepen. 
 
 Conclusion 
The factors which lead to the January uprising, the forces which took part in it, 
and the post-Mubarak retrenchments all take place in a complex economic and 
political landscape. Within it, the liberal and particularly leftist groups which 
took part in the uprising are finding themselves increasingly under attack by the 
military junta, former elements of the regime attempting to retain a measure of 
influence, and the Brotherhood, attempting to secure power for the first time. 
The vast organisational and financial resources these different groups can draw 
upon – individually and collectively – far outshine any resources pro-democracy 
                                                                            
8 SCAF’s “supra-constitutional principles” documents indicates it will select members of the 
Constitutional Council from among the professions.  
9 For an introduction, see “The Brotherhood's businessmen,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, February 13th, 
2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/654581; last accessed March 2nd, 2012 
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groups can muster, as recent controversies over “foreign funding” and the 
military’s effective use of state-controlled media show, and from this point of 
view prospects are far from optimistic. The basic, long-term issues which lead to 
the uprising, however, are not being addressed by the dominant forces of the 
post-Mubarak landscape, and in this respect there remains a space to build an 
effective opposition movement, much like independent trade unions have 
managed to do over the past decade.  
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